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Abstract: This article focuses on downloaded ad-
generating software programs and the legal responses to
them. Despite their potentially legitimate advertising role,
these downloaded programs cause various problems for
users. To determine what kinds of computer problems have
prompted legal action and government-enforced remedies,
this article studies numerous recent cases brought against
purveyors of ad-generating programs. Some of these actions
were litigated by state attorneys general under new anti-
spyware statutes. The Federal Trade Commission, the State
of New York, and private parties have pursued other claims
under traditional anti-fraud or computer crime laws. This
discussion analyzes actions according to the various types of
marketing behavior that the government targeted for
enforcement. In a market where disputes abound regarding
the problematic nature of "spyware," public policy makers
and industry need to understand exactly what kinds of
problems in the marketplace have triggered legal responses.
This article concludes with recommendations for necessary
federal legislation, including the role of the states.
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A STUDY OF SPYWARE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS IN PURSUIT OF SOUND
INTERNET ADVERTISING POLICY
Commentators have noted for some time now that there is no
consensus definition for "spyware."' Both spyware and "adware" are
used to deliver targeted advertisements to individuals surfing the
Web. These programs deliver ads in pop-up windows or bars that run
across the top or bottom of a screen. 2 Both types of programs are
often triggered by the user's particular web activity.3
Companies that make programs to run continuously and trigger
ads in response to websites that users visit include Claria (formerly
Gator), WhenU, and 18oSolutions.4 Others include Secure Computer,
Digital Enterprises, and Direct Revenue. These organizations are not
international fronts for criminal enterprises.5 They are domestic
companies providing in-demand interactive marketing services.
High-profile clients such as Verizon, Merck, FTD, Motorola, and T-
1 Liying Sun, Who Can Fix the Spyware Problem?, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 555 (2007);
Martin Boldt & Bengt Carlsson, Privacy-Invasive Software and Preventive Mechanisms,
IEEE COMPUTER SOCIETY 21 (PROC.OF THE INT'L CONF. ON Sys. AND NETWORKS COMMC'N.)
(Oct. 2oo6), available at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=io.1.1.1O7.5949&rep=repi&type=pdf;
Agenda, Fed. Trade Comm'n Public Workshop, Monitoring Software on your PC:
Spyware, Adware and Other Software 2 (Apr. 19, 2004).
2 Some commentators use the term "malware" to describe programs that have nothing but
a pernicious purpose, such as delivering viruses or stealing private information from the
computer hard drive to facilitate identity theft. See generally Webopedia,
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/m/malware.htm (last visited May 30, 2009).
This paper focuses on programs downloaded for advertising purposes. This discussion is
not about "malware" although some of the legal actions discussed below may address some
of that type of software, as well.
3 Eric Chien, Techniques of Adware and Spyware, SYSTEMS AND NETWORKS
COMMUNICATIONS 22 (PROC. OF THE VIRUS BULL. CONF.) (2005), available at
http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/techniques.of.adware.and.spyware.pdf.
4 Benjamin Edelman, "Spyware": Research, Testing, Legislation, and Suits,
http://www.benedelman.org/spyware/#suits (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
5 Ben Elgin, Guess What- You Asked for those Pop Up Ads, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE,
June 28, 2004,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/o4-26/b3889095-mzo63.htm;
Annalee Newitz, Don't Call It Spyware, WIRED, Dec. 2005,
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.12/spyware.html.
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Mobile utilize their adware. 6 Even the Anti-Spyware Coalition
acknowledges the potential value of various software that it describes
as "Spyware and Potentially Unwanted Technology." The group
explains that "Advertising Display Software [m]ay be linked to other
software that is wanted, subsidizing its cost," and "[m]ay provide
advertising that is wanted by the user."7
Despite the potential value that ad-generating software can
deliver, this marketing method creates many problems. Consumers
complain about too many pop-up or banner ads that frustrate their
internet browsing. Sometimes these ads cannot be closed and the only
way the computer user can reestablish control is by shutting down and
restarting.
More problematic are programs that overwhelm computers and
necessitate costly clean up and repairs to restore their functionality. In
organizations, costs are significant when such problems repeat
themselves on multiple workstations. One analysis concluded that
spyware cleanup costs a 1,000-person organization $83,000 annually.8
In 2006, the Radicati Group estimated that cleanup of each workstation
costs $265 per spyware infection.9 Additionally, spyware can expose
confidential personal or corporate information. These threats to
information create the risk of unwitting regulatory violations under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for publicly-traded corporations, HIPAA for
health care professionals, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act for
financial services firms, in addition to the privacy policies of most
organizations. 1°
6 Edelman, supra note 4.
7 Anti-Spyware Coalition, Anti-Spyware Coalition's Definitions Document,
http://www.antispywarecoalition.org/documents/DefinitionsJune292oo6.htm (last
visited Apr. 18, 2009).
8 Mark Gibbs, The Cost ofSpyware, NETWORK WORLD, Apr.26, 2004,
http://www.networkworld.com/columnists/2004/o426backspin.html.
9 Is3, Learning Center: The Cost of Spyware to Your Business,
http://www.is3.com/learning/CostOfSpywareToYourBusiness.do (last visited Apr. 18,
2009).
10 Sarah Lysecki, Spyware Threatens Corporate Integrity, Customer Trust, COMPUTING
CANADA, Apr. 22, 2005,
http://www.itbusiness.ca/it/client/en/CDN/DetailNewsPrint.asp?id=174ll;
Andrea Nixon, Policy and Legal Implications of Spyware and Data Privacy, EDUCAUSE Q.,
Nov. 1, 2oo6, at 5.
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In between the annoying and the costly are various problems that
hamper computer productivity. Some programs reset computer
settings, such as home pages on Internet Explorer. Some cannot be
readily removed, either manually or with anti-spyware programs.
Others reinstall under different names when they are "removed."
Adding insult to injury are anti-spyware programs that actually behave
like spyware themselves.11
As a result of these costly problems, producers of ad-generating
software are under significant attack through litigation and
regulation.12 Notwithstanding the lack of consensus about which ad-
generating software should be characterized as "spyware," fifteen
states have already passed anti-spyware legislation. 13 The U.S.
Congress has been considering anti-spyware bills for several years
without passage.14
Not every problem a computer user has with his or her computer
because of ad-generating software may justify a legal remedy. To
determine what kinds of computer problems have prompted legal action
and government-enforced remedies, this article studies numerous
recent cases against purveyors of ad-generating programs. State
attorneys general litigated some of these actions under new anti-
spyware statutes, while the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), the
State of New York, and private parties have pursued other claims under
traditional anti-fraud or computer crime laws. These cases reveal that
regulators are undeterred by the lack of any consensus pertaining to the
definition of "spyware." In the eyes of federal and state regulators, the
behaviors alleged in these cases were actionable under long-held
concepts in deceptive advertising law, as well as under new provisions in
state spyware statutes. All the actions discussed below include
complaints about the classic deceptive practice of making false or
misleading statements to a consumer about the nature of the product
"Chien, supra note 3.
12 See Alfred Cheng, Does Spybot Finally Have Some Allies? An Analysis of Current
Spyware Legislation, 58 SMU L. REV. 1497 (2005).
13 See National Conference of State Legislatures, State Spyware Laws,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/privay/spywarelaws.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
14 Brian Krebs, Spy vs. I-Spy: A Tale of Dueling Anti-Spyware Bills,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, May 29, 2007,
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2oo7/o5/spy vs ispy-a-tale of-dueling.ht
ml.
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that the consumer is acquiring. Most of the actions discussed below
also include some deception that is unique to computing and software.
On his website, Benjamin Edelman chronicles enforcement actions
according to the particular vendor that is sued. 15 Conversely, the
following discussion analyzes actions according to the various types of
marketing behavior that the government targeted for enforcement. The
article discusses whether existing consumer protection laws sufficiently
remedy alleged harms from problem programs, or whether a different
regulatory approach is needed to address the harms typical of ad-
generating programs. These actions, which the parties settled, reveal
legal issues that could be problematic for law enforcement if taken all
the way through a trial and appeal. This study of pending and concluded
actions suggests what is needed in spyware-specific federal legislation,
including meaningful recommendations about federal preemption of
state spyware regulation.
First, this article explains the marketing uses of these computer
programs, and whether they are called adware or spyware.
I. MARKETING VIA DOWNLOADED PROGRAMS
The marketing model that employs ad-generating programs begins
like the sale of many other forms of advertising. Legitimate
companies looking for ways to advertise their goods or services hire ad
agencies to place their advertising content on the Internet.
Alternatively, advertisers may contact Internet ad purveyors
themselves. The advertiser or ad agency will purchase ad space from
adware vendors like Claria and others mentioned above.
Adware vendors employ a variety of vehicles to get clients' ads into
end users' computers, including gaming software, peer-to-peer file
sharing programs, toolbars for Internet browsers, cursors, clip art, or
screen savers.16 When computer users download these applications,
they also get ad-generating modules that run concurrently with the
application. 17 Programmers use a variety of techniques to trigger
1' Edelman, supra note 4.
i6 Andrew Conry-Murray & Vincent Weafer, The Symantec Guide to Home Internet
Security 68 (2005), available at
www.informit.com/content/images/o321356411/samplechapter/Conry-cho5.pdf.
17 Dan Tynan & Tom Spring, The Hidden Money Trail, PC WORLD, Oct. 3, 2005,
http://www.pcworld.com/printable/article/id,122495/printable.html.
The existence of the advertising component may be disclosed in an end user licensing
agreement ("EULA"). These ad-generating programs may avoid the label of spyware based
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downloading, storage, and execution of interactive advertising
programs on end users' computers.18
A survey of media directors of interactive advertising agencies
found that a majority believes "click-through" is the best measure of
online advertising effectiveness. 19 In other words, if the computer
user responds to a pop-up ad or banner by clicking on it and being
directed to the advertiser's website, then the ad has provided the
advertising client real value. Such an ad-generating program targets
users by tracking the content of the user's Internet browsing to trigger
pop-ups that this particular user might be interested in following to
learn more about this advertiser's product.
Despite the expected value of good targeting to increase "click
through" rates, the foregoing study also found that only 33% of the
respondents employed a click-through pricing model.20 More than
90% of the respondents frequently used a "cost per thousand" to price
banner ads, a metric that is used to price advertising in other mass
media as well.21
Adding to this paradoxical pricing strategy is the presence of
numerous "affiliates" that ad agencies use to distribute online
advertising. These third parties are usually paid per "impression," the
on these disclosures regardless of whether customers have read or understood the entire
EUIA to realize all that they are downloading. See infra notes 109-13 and accompanying
text. Others contend, however, that the notices in adware are inadequate to fully inform
users that their Internet activity is being monitored to trigger the ads. Such commentators
characterize all such programs as spyware. See Daniel B. Garrie, et al., The Legal Status of
Spyware, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 157, 161 (2006); Chien, supra note 3; Cade Metz, Spy
Stoppers, PC MAGAZINE, Mar. 2, 2004,
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,1895,1524249,oo.asp. Researchers are studying the
best way to alert consumers to the nature of what they are downloading. See Jordan M.
Blanke, "Robust Notice" and "Informed Consent:" The Keys to Successful Spyware
Legislation, 7 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REv. 1, 2 (20o6), available at
http://www.stlr.org/html/volume7/blanke.pdf; Nathaniel Good et al., User Choices and
Regret: Understanding Users' Decision Process about Consensually Acquired Spyware, 2
ISJLP 283 (2006). This article will only discuss those issues in the context of legal
mandates for customer notices.
1s Chien, supra note 3.
19 Fuyuan Shen, Banner Advertisement Pricing, Measurement, and Pretesting Practices:
Perspectives from Interactive Agencies, 31 J. ADVERTISING 59, 62 (2002).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 62-65.
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simple appearance of an ad on a user's screen. 22 This payment system
motivates these distributors to load ads and ad-generating software all
over the Internet, without regard to whether particular viewers would
be interested in that ad or that advertiser's product. Other affiliates
are software programmers who are motivated to get their programs
distributed as widely as possible in exchange for bundling ad-
generating programs into their freeware.23 In other words, the more
distributors who participate in the process, most with financial
incentives unrelated to directing traffic back to advertisers' website,
the less targeting is done.
Current common law of agency and contracts seldom imposes
liability on vendors when their independent contractors improperly
distribute a product through deceptive advertising practices like those
discussed in the cases below.24 Further, no existing state spyware law
expressly requires that adware vendors monitor their affiliate
distributors. A few states impose liability for "conscious avoidance" of
knowledge about prohibited downloads.25 This is the closest the law
currently comes to binding an adware vendor for acts within their
affiliate distribution channel. Unfortunately, this "conscious
avoidance" standard requires proof that the vendor turned a blind eye
to the unlawful acts of an affiliate, which may be difficult to prove if
the distribution channel is vast and any individual programmer is
remote from the adware vendor. Accordingly, as the cases below
reveal, the role of these affiliates, and adware vendors' control of
them, will be critical to a proper legislative response.
Some contend that targeting ads to accomplish click-through
should not be the standard for measuring online advertising
effectiveness.26 These researchers contend that brand enhancement is
a valuable function of Internet advertising and results from exposure
22 CTR. FOR DEM. AND TECH., FOLLOWING THE MONEY: How ADVERTISING DOLLARS
ENCOURAGE NUISANCE AND HARMFUL ADWARE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO REVERSE THE
TREND 1, 6 (20o6), http://www.cdt.org/privacy/2oo6o32oadware.pdf.
23 Id.
24 John Murphy & Harry Street, STREET ON TORTS 597 (12th ed. 2007).
25 See, e.g., S.B. 1436, Cal. State Leg., 2003-2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004).
26 Rex Briggs & Nigel Hollis Advertising on the Web: Is There Response Before Click-
Through? 37 J. ADVERTISING RES. 33, 33-34 (1997); Gerard Broussard, How Advertising
Frequency Can Work to Build Online Advertising Effectiveness, 42 INT'L J. OF MARKET
RES. 439 (2000); Xavier Drrze & Franqois-Xavier Hussherr, InternetAdvertising: Is
Anybody Watching? 17 J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING 8, 8-9 (2003).
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frequency, not unlike advertising in other mass media such as
magazines and TV.27 Under this theory, presenting computer users
with multiple banner and pop-up ads about an advertiser's product
accomplishes the legitimate marketing interests of the advertiser
regardless of the number of direct responses to the ad.28 Under this
theory, paying affiliates for the volume of ad appearances triggered by
the downloaded software is a logical pricing model (although one
study concluded that gains in awareness diminish after seven
exposures).29
While online ad frequency may be building brand enhancement
for advertisers, the programs that deliver those ads are often
overwhelming computers and frustrating computer users. These
users complain to government officials, who respond with legal
action.30 These consumer problems and the legal responses they have
spawned are discussed in the following section.
II. SPYWARE ACTIONS BASED ON ExPRESS MISSTATEMENTS AND
NONDISCLOSURE FRAUD
Federal and state law expressly prohibits false, misleading or
deceptive advertising.31 As the following cases reflect, the FTC and
state attorneys general do not need specific spyware legislation, or
even an accepted definition of spyware, to prosecute vendors of ad-
generating software for fraud.
Federal Trade Commission v. Enternet Media.32 is the seminal
case and is the closest spyware example to traditional fraudulent
misrepresentation. A seller represented a product to be of one type or
quality, but what the consumer actually got was something completely
27Id.
2s Chun-Yao Huang & Chen-Shun Lin, Modeling the Audience's Banner Ad Exposure for
InternetAdvertising Planning, 35 J. ADVERTISING 123, 124 (2OO6).
29 Broussard, supra note 26.
30 See supra notes 8-11.
31 See generally Jon Mize, Fencing Off the Path of Least Resistance: Re-Examining the
Role of Little FTC Act Actions in the Law of False Advertising, 72 TENN. L. REV. 653
(2005).
32 Complaint for Injunctive and other Equitable Relief at 2, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Enternet
Media, No. CV-o5-7777 (C.D. Ca. Nov. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o523135/o5111ocompo523135.pdf.
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different. The FTC alleged that the defendants duped consumers into
downloading and installing exploitative software code by disguising it
as innocuous freeware such as Internet browser upgrades, music files,
cell phone ring tones, and song lyrics.33 Most of the downloaded
programs were not the promised freeware at all. Instead, they were
programs that tracked Internet activity, changed homepage settings
and displayed pop-up ads.34
Fraud can be proved by express misstatements and also by failure
to disclose material information to the buyer about the promised good
or service. One affiliate in Enternet Media operated a website that
offered free music files to bloggers and others to play as background
music on their websites. In this instance, although the user received
the promised free music, the downloads also included unwanted,
undisclosed code.35 Once the music was copied and pasted into blogs
or other websites, the undisclosed program captured the sites and
used them to distribute the exploitative code even further.36
In this case, the vendors' express misstatements about allegedly
free software and failure to disclose the presence of "exploitative"
programs allegedly constituted deceptive acts and practices under the
FTC Act. 37 The FTC and Enternet Media (along with various
individual defendants) entered into a settlement agreement in August,
2006. The final order permanently enjoins Enternet Media and its
affiliates from all of the offending Internet advertising practices the
FTC alleged.38 The FTC fined the defendants over $8.5 million, but
suspended $6.5 million.39 The defendants were placed on eight-year
"probation" during which the FTC will monitor them. Additionally,
the defendants were imposed with multiple monitoring and reporting
obligations regarding the Internet advertising activities of all "their
officers, agents, directors, employees, salespersons, independent
33 Id. at 6.
34 Id. at 7.
35 Id. at 6.
36 Id. at 6-7.
37 45 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2007).
38 Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 5, Fed.
Trade Comm'n v. Enternet Media, No. CV-o5-7777 (C.D. Cal. August 22, 20o6), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o523135/o6o823enternetmediastlmnt.pdf.
39 Id. at 8.
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contractors, subsidiaries, affiliates, successors, assigns, and all other
persons in active concert or participation with any of them.... "40
Similarly, in State of New York v. Intermix Media, the New York
Attorney General accused the defendants of deceptively and
surreptitiously bundling invasive ad-generating programs with "free"
games, cursors, screensavers, or other software programs. 41 To
support its complaint, the state relied on the general business code,
which prohibits false advertising and deceptive business practices, as
well as the common law claim of trespass to chattels.42 The state
alleged more than three million downloads of the offending software
to New York computers. 43
In 2005, Intermix Media agreed to pay $7.5 million in penalties
and profit disgorgement, and accepted a ban on adware distribution. 44
Brad Greenspan, the founder and former CEO of Intermix, agreed to
pay $750,000 in penalties and profit disgorgement.45 Acez Software,
an affiliate that was downloading Intermix adware with free
screensavers, agreed to pay $35,000.46
A similar action is pending in New York against Direct Revenue
and several of its individual officers.47 In this case, the lack of an
agreed-upon definition of spyware could be fatal to one of the state's
40 Id. at 15.
41 Verified Petition at 3, People of the State of New York v. Intermix Media, Inc., No.
401394-05 (N.Y.S. Apr. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Intermix Media Petition], available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media center/200s/apr/VerifiedPetition.pdf.
42 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 349-350 (2007).
43 Intermix Media Petition, supra note 41, at 3.
44 Consent and Stipulation at 4, New York v. Intermix Media, Inc., No. 401394-05 (N.Y.S.
Sept. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media-center/2005/oct/Intermix%2oCOJ.pdf.
45 Att'y Gen. of the State of N.Y.: Internet Bureau, Assurance of Discontinuance at 3, In the
Matter of Brad Greenspan (Sept. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media-center/2005/oct/Greenspan%2oAOD.pdf.
46 See Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Att'y Gen., Internet Exec Held Accountable for
Adware, Spyware (Oct. 20, 2005), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/pres/2005/oct/oct2oa-05.html.
47 Verified Petition at 7, New York v. Direct Revenue, No. 401325-06 (N.Y.S. Apr. 4, 2oo6)
[hereinafter New York v. Direct Revenue Petition], available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media-center/2006/apr/Direct Revenue Verified
Petition.pdf.
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allegations of express misstatement. New York asserts that Direct
Revenue offered a free program on a website that falsely stated that
the program was "100% Spyware Free."48 This vendor, like most
adware vendors, differentiates its ad-generating software from
"spyware" based on an End User License Agreement ("EULA")
associated with the products that disclosed the presence of the ad-
generating code.49 New York has no spyware-specific legislation that
provides any definition of spyware. Plaintiffs and prosecutors will
have difficulty proving intentional falsity by adware vendors about
whether their products are spyware without an accepted standard of
what is, or is not, spyware. 50 New York's case against Direct Revenue
appears strong- with only one allegation that could fail without a
statutory definition of "spyware." Accordingly, the alleged express
misrepresentation claim will hinge on a conclusion that "100%
Spyware Free" was a known falsity.
A consumer class action against Direct Revenue in Illinois federal
court asserted many of the same complaints as the New York case.51
The case survived the defendants' motion to dismiss and the parties
agreed to injunctive relief.52 Ultimately, the defendants agreed to pay
$300,000 in attorneys' fees and expenses.53
Defendants deny any wrongdoing when they enter the settlements
like those in Enternet Media and Intermix Media. Thus, such cases
do not reflect any legal conclusion by a court about the alleged
wrongdoing. Nevertheless, these cases challenge whether any special
legislation targeting ad-generating software is necessary to address
classic fraudulent misstatements or nondisclosure about the nature of
the product the vendor is providing. The FTC and New York pursued
48 Id.
49 See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
50 The Direct Revenue complaint includes a violation of New York criminal law for
computer tampering, which prohibits any intentional altering or destroying of another
person's computer programs or data. See New York v. Direct Revenue Petition, supra note
47-
51 Mem. Op. and Order at 1, Soleto v. Direct Revenue, No. 05 C 2562 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29,
2005), available at http://www.sunbelt-software.com/ihs/alex/drruling.pdf.
52 Id. at 28.
53 Settlement Agreement and Limited Release at 4, 13, Soleto v. Direct Revenue, No. 05 C
2562 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2oo6), available at
http://www.spywarewarrior.com/mvp/DirectRevenue-SA.pdf.
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and settled these cases under long-held authority to regulate false and
misleading advertising. New York also relied on a common law tort
for the protection of personal property. All states grant similar
authority to their state attorneys general to regulate in-state actions
for false and misleading advertising. The tort of trespass to chattels
has been widely discussed as a remedy to assaults on computers from
unwanted ad-generating programs.5 4
Like the foregoing cases prosecuted under existing anti-fraud
authority, most of the actions discussed next also include some claim
of false statement or nondisclosure about the nature of the program(s)
the computer user is actually downloading. The following cases are
distinguishable, however, because they also include complaints about
programming tactics that are employed by the ad-generating software.
Do unique computing and software tactics suggest that new or special
authority is necessary? These next cases address that question.
III. SPYWARE ACTIONS BASED ON DRIVE-BY DOWNLOADS AND
UNINSTALL/REINSTALL TACTICS
The FTC maintains a basic enforcement premise that a computer
user's hardware is his or her own property that cannot be disrupted or
violated simply because a software distributor can access it.55 Many
current federal and state statutory and common laws that protect
personal property are based on this same principle. The following
cases reflect issues beyond misstating or failing to disclose the exact
nature of downloaded software. These cases include programming
tactics that actually alter the computer users' existing software and
computer settings.
The FrC's first spyware case was Federal Trade Commission v.
Seismic Entertainment, in which the Commission alleged that
defendants exploited a known vulnerability in Internet Explorer to
download spyware to users' computers without their knowledge.56
54 See Blanke, supra note 17; but see Alan F. Blakley et al., Coddling Spies: Why the Law
Doesn't Adequately Address Computer Spyware, 25 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 7-9 (2005),
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2005dltroo25.html.
55 DEBORAH PLATT MAJORAS, FINDING SOLUTIONS TO FIGHT SPYWARE: THE FTC'S THREE
ENFORCEMENT PRINCIPLES 5 (Feb. 9, 2oo6),
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/o6o2o9cdtspyware.pdf.
56 Compl. for Inj. and Other Equitable Relief, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Seismic Entm't, Inc.,
No. 04-377 -JD (D.N.H. Oct. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Seismic Entm't Complaint].
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This is referred to as a "drive-by" tactic.57 According to the complaint,
the offending software hijacked consumers' home pages, caused an
incessant stream of pop-up ads, and allowed secret installation of
additional software programs that generated more ads and tracked
users' Internet activity. 58 These unannounced programs caused
computers to severely slow down or crash.59
A federal district court temporarily enjoined the defendants from
using this method to distribute their software.6° A default judgment
was entered against two defendants who never answered, which
included injunctions and a penalty over $1.8 million.6,
The pending action of the New York Attorney General against
Direct Revenue also includes a complaint of drive-by downloads: "In
such instances, simply visiting a given website infected the user's
computer with spyware programs."62
In Federal Trade Commission v. Odysseus Marketing, defendants
offered a free software program that purported to make users
anonymous when using peer-to-peer file-sharing programs. 63 Along
with this "anonymizer" program, defendants' software also installed
other harmful, unwanted programs.64 These facts reflect the same
nondisclosure deception discussed above in Enternet Media and
Intermix. Additionally, in this case consumers could not remove the
unwanted ad-generating software by any reasonable means. 65 The
57 Id.
58 Id. at IO.
59 Id.
60 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Seismic Entm't, No. 04-377 -JD, 2oo6 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 752o6, at
*15 (D. N.H. July 14, 2006).
61 Order of Default J., Permanent Inj. and Other Equitable Relief Against Sanford Wallace
and Smartbot.net, Inc. at 16, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Seismic Entm't, Inc., No. 04-377-JD
(D.N.H. Mar. 22, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o423142/WallaceFinaIJudgment.pdf.
62 See New York v. Direct Revenue Petition, supra note 47, at 12.
63 Compl. for Inj. and Other Equitable Relief at 4, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Odysseus Mktg.,
Inc., No. 05-CV-330-SM (D.N.H. Sept. 21, 2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o4232o5/oo929compo4232o5.pdf.
64 Id. at 2.
65 Id. at3.
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"Add/Remove" function in the Microsoft Windows operating system
was disabled in the code.66 The instructions that defendants provided
for uninstalling the program were extremely difficult for consumers to
find, and did not work once a user located them. 67 The FTC alleged
that failure to provide users with a reasonable means to locate and
remove the program was an unfair act or practice in violation of
Section 5 of the FTC Act.68 Ultimately, the defendants agreed to a
permanent injunction and a suspended penalty of $1.75 million.69
Programming revisions to Microsoft's Internet Explorer, such as
upgrades and security patches, have helped prevent additional "drive-
by" cases. Unfortunately, motivated marketers seem to find new
programming tactics to which Microsoft and others are always
reacting. For example, in 2008, the FTC moved to hold the Odysseus
Marketing defendants in contempt based on violations of their
injunction. 70 Allegedly, defendants have been diverting users of
MySpace.com by downloading computer code onto their computers
without their consent when the users navigate to the MySpace site.7'
Once diverted to different web sites, ads barraged the users, simply to
earn advertising commissions. 72 This alleged contempt for the
consent decree order suggests that the FTC's traditional anti-fraud
enforcement and penalties may be insufficient to deter determined
adware vendors.
A 2007 FTC case against ERG Ventures for distribution of its
"Media Motor Application" 73 has many allegations of express
661d. at 9.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 12.
69 Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Inj. and Settlement of Claims for Monetary Relief
at 8, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Seismic Entm't, Inc., No. o4 -3 77 -JD (D.N.H. Oct. 20, 2oo6),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o4232o5/o6il2lodysseusstipfinal.pdf.
70 Pl.'s Mot. for an Order Holding Walter Rines, Online Turbo Merch., Inc., and Sanford
Wallace in Civil Contempt for their Violations of this Ct.'s Permanent Inj., Fed. Trade
Comm'n v. Odysseus Mktg. Inc., No. 05-CV-33o-SM at 2 (D.N.H. filed Jan. 23, 2oo8),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o4232o5/o8o131motion.pdf.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Compl. for Inj. and Other Equitable Relief, Fed. Trade Comm'n vs. ERG Ventures, LLC,
No. 3:o6-CV-oo578-LRH-VPC (D. Nev. filed Oct. 30, 2oo6), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o623192/o6lo3oergventuresmplt.pdf.
[Vol. 5:2304
20091
misstatements and deceptive nondisclosures similar to the complaints
against Enternet Media and Intermix. Unlike those cases, however,
the ERG complaint includes an allegation that the ad-generating
software programs actually disabled at least two popular anti-spyware
software programs: Lavasoft's Ad-Aware SE ("Ad-Aware") and
Microsoft's Windows Defender.74 In the case of Ad-Aware, the user's
computer would shut down prior to completing the Ad-Aware scan.
As a result, the Ad-Aware scan never fully ran and never removed any
of ERG's ad-generating programs on the computer.75 When the user
would run Microsoft's Windows Defender, ERG's ad-generating
software programs were added to the "Allow" list. As a result,
Windows Defender would ignore those files in its scan and users
would never be advised to remove them.76
These drive-by downloads and uninstall/reinstall tactics reflect
issues beyond misstating or failing to disclose the exact nature of
downloaded software. These cases include programming tactics that
actually alter the computer users' existing software and computer
settings. These tactics violate the FTC's basic enforcement tenet that a
computer user's hardware is his or her own property that cannot be
disrupted or violated simply because a software distributor can.77 As
mentioned above, the common law tort of trespass to chattels is one
example of existing law that could address these tactics.78 The basic
claim of "unfair" business practices that the FTC and all state
attorneys general can litigate also would seemingly be appropriate to
combat these programming tactics that alter a computer user's
existing software and computer settings. Notwithstanding applicable
legal authority, however, the alleged contempt by the Odysseus
Marketing defendants suggests that existing remedies against adware
vendors may not suffice. New legislative strategies may need to
include harsher penalties and cover more participants in the adware
distribution channel to offset the financial incentives that keep these
marketing tactics thriving.79
74 Id. at 38.
75 Id. at 39.
76 Id. at 40.
77 See Seismic Entm't Complaint, supra note 56.
78 See Blanke, supra note 17, at 29 and accompanying text; Blakley, supra note 54, at 6.
79 See infra notes 120-129 and accompanying text.
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Finally, in New York's fraud case against Intermix Media, the state
also alleged that the defendants' programs did not make the ad-
generating software accessible in the "All Programs" or "Programs"
list.80 The programs were hidden in folders not usually associated
with programs, were not listed in the "Add/Remove Programs" utility,
nor was there any alternative uninstall utility for the software.8' These
allegations are programming choices that make the program
inconvenient to access. Arguably, they do not affirmatively affect the
individual's computer or program settings as the previous examples
reflected. These programming inconveniences would not seem to rise
to the level of deception.8 2
Presumably, if lawmakers believe consumers require legal
protection against programmers who make it hard to uninstall their
ad-generating code, a legislative response will be required. Current
state spyware laws only prohibit intentional deception regarding
installation and removal instructions. 83 Reasonable minds might
differ on whether the inconvenience in finding a program to uninstall
it would rise to the level of intentional deception. Proposed federal
law would mandate uninstall instructions for all downloaded ad-
generating software.8 4 This proposed federal approach avoids any
conclusion about whether the installation process was intentionally
deceptive and simply makes removal instructions part of mandated
notices. Ad-generating code that does not include such an instruction
or that does not uninstall pursuant to the instructions would properly
be deemed "spyware" without any proof of the defendants' intent.
IV. SPYWARE ACTIONS BASED ON AD-GENERATING SOFTWARE THAT
POSES AS ANTI-SPYWARE PROTECTION
Nothing would seem to be more flagrantly deceptive than infecting
a computer with spyware under the guise of an offer to detect and
80 Intermix Media Petition, supra note 41, at 24.
81 Id. at 27.
82 The claims against Intermix Media ultimately fall into the "Uninstall/Reinstall"
category, because the program also reinstalled the ad-generating code after a user deleted
it. Id. at 28.
83 Edelman, supra note 4.
84 H.R. 964, 11oth Cong. § 2(a)(5) (2007).
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eliminate spyware. Yet, that is the scenario in several cases brought
by the FTC and state regulators.
In 2006, the FTC settled two suits against vendors of spyware
detection programs for their deceptive claims that consumers'
computers had been remotely scanned and spyware had been
detected. 85 Consumers received pop-up and e-mail messages about
the risks to their computers, as well as fake warnings purportedly
generated by Internet Explorer or the Windows operating system.86
Ultimately, consumers purchased products such as Spykiller and
Spyware Assassin that generally failed to detect most spyware on
infected computers. 87
The vendors of Spykiller entered a settlement requiring payments
of more than $900,000, as well as forfeiture of several luxury
vehicles.88 MaxTheater, the vendor of Spyware Assassin, agreed to
pay $76,000 and is prohibited from all future marketing and sales of
any anti-spyware software. 89
In its first case under Washington's spyware-specific legislation,
the state attorney general accused Secure Computer and three affiliate
advertisers of marketing a product called Spyware Cleaner that falsely
claimed computers were infected with spyware, and also accused
Secure Computer and its affiliates of selling those consumers a
program that claimed to remove it.9o The program not only failed to
85 Compl. for Inj. and Other Equitable Relief, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Trustsoft, No. H 05
1905, (S.D. Tex. filed May 31, 2005) [hereinafter Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Trustsoft
Complaint], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o523o59/o5o623compo523o59.pdf; Compl. for Inj. and
Other Equitable Relief, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. MaxTheater, No. 2:05-cv-0oo69-LRS (E.D.
Wash. filed Mar. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Fed. Trade Comm'n v. MaxTheater Complaint],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o423213/o5o31lcompo423213.pdf.
86 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Trustsoft Complaint, supra note 85, at 12-13; Fed. Trade Comm'n
v. MaxTheater Complaint, supra note 85, at 9.
87 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Trustsoft Complaint, supra note 85, at 40; Fed. Trade Comm'n v.
MaxTheater Complaint, supra note 85, at 21.
88 Final Stipulated Order for Permanent Inj. and Monetary J., Fed. Trade Comm'n v.
Trustsoft, No. H 05 1905 at 7, 11-12 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 20o6), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o523o59/o6olo4trustsoftfinalorder.pdf.
89 Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Inj. and Other Equitable Relief. Fed. Trade
Comm'n v. MaxTheater, No. 2:05-cv-ooo69-LRS at 6-8 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 6, 2005),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o423213/o512o6maxtheaterfinalorder.pdf.
9o Compl. for Inj. and Additional Relief, State of Washington v. Secure Computer LLC, No.
Co6-o126 at 8.11 (W.D. Wa. filed Jan. 24, 2oo6) [hereinafter State of Washington v. Secure
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detect most spyware programs, but also rendered computers more
susceptible to attacks by tampering with the user's security settings.91
The Washington spyware statute specifically prohibits installing
software on a computer by intentionally misrepresenting to the
computer owner that the software is necessary for security.92 The
complaint included alleged violations of the federal CAN-SPAM Act,
the Washington Unsolicited E-mail Act, and Washington's Computer
Spyware Act.93 The state entered consent decrees with most of the
defendants and imposed fines totaling $1 million dollars.94
Washington settled similar complaints against QuickShield and
Spyware Slayer for much smaller amounts. 95 A 2007 case is still
pending against several defendants for products marketed as Registry
Sweeper Pro, Registry Rinse, Registry Doc, Registry Cleaner, and
Registry Cleaner Pro.96
Of these cases against vendors of spyware-detection programs,
only the Secure Computer case in Washington includes a claim that
the downloaded product interacted with users' computers in a
detrimental manner. The rest of the cases against vendors of spyware-
detection programs reflect classic deceptive advertising claims, such
as telling consumers they need a product when they do not. Those
allegedly deceptive ads were not triggered by downloaded software
that took up processor or hard drive space and/or were difficult to
remove. Instead, the deceptive ads were embedded in certain
Computer LLC Complaint], available at
http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Another/News/Press-Releases/2oo6/Complaint.p
df.
91 Id. at 8.18.
92 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.207.040(1) (2007).
93 State of Washington v. Secure Computer LLC Complaint, supra note 90, at 6.5, 6.9, 6.13,
6.17, 6.21, 6.22, 6.26, 6.27, 7.3, 7.6, 8.8, 8.13, 8.21, 9.3, 9.6, 9.9, 9.12, 9.15, 9.18, 9.24, 9.28.
94 Consent Decree as to Defs. Secure Computer LLC and Paul Burke, State of Washington v.
Secure Computer LLC, No. o7-2-04987-8SEA at 1 (W.D. Wa. Nov. 30, 2oo6), available at
http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/News/Press-Releases/2007
/SecureLinkComplainto2o7o7.pdf.
95 Edelman, supra note 4.
96 Compl. for Inj. and Additional Relief, State of Washington v. SecureLink Networks LLC,
No. 07-2-04987-8SEA (King County Super. Ct. filed Feb. 7, 20o7), available at
http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/News/Press-Releases/2007/SecureLinkCo
mplainto2o7o7.pdf.
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websites. The transactions included downloaded software, but that is
the only similarity to the other regulatory "spyware" cases. These
cases of ad-generating software that pose as anti-spyware protection
programs reflect nothing new or different in deceptive advertising law
and require no new legislative response.
V. MOVIELAND.COM ACTIONS
The recent federal and state cases against Movieland.com are
further examples of express misstatements and nondisclosure. The
facts are unique, however, in that the ad-generating software itself
made the misstatements about consumers' supposed contractual
obligations to the defendants.
Washington and the FTC pursued actions against multiple
defendants regarding a movie download service promoted through
websites such as movieland.com, moviepass.tv, and popcorn.net.9 7
The FTC acted under its traditional authority against deceptive and
unfair trade practices.98 Washington sued under its spyware-specific
legislation.99
The defendants' putative business is an Internet download
subscription service that provides access to news, sports, games, and
adult content.100 Their websites offered consumers a free three-day
trial of the services. Consumers who accepted the free trial
downloaded a "download manager" that would provide access to the
content. Unbeknownst to computer users, however, billing software
was also downloaded onto their computers. After the trial period, the
defendants could remotely activate the billing software, causing a pop-
up window to appear that stated the trial period had expired. A
97 See infra footnotes 98-99.
98 Compl. for Permanent Inj. and Other Equitable Relief, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Digital
Enters., No. CV-o6-4923 at 47 (C.D. Ca. filed Aug. 8, 20o6) [hereinafter Fed. Trade
Comm'n v. Digital Enters. Complaint], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o623oo8/o6o8o8movielandcmplt.pdf.
99 Compl. for Inj. Relief, State of Washington v. Digital Enters., No. o6-2-26o3o-9SEA at
6.1-12.1 (King County Super. Ct. filed Aug. 4, 2006) [hereinafter State of Washington v.
Digital Enters. Complaint], available at
http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Another/News/Press-Releases/2oo6/MovielandC
omplaint8-14-o6.pdf.
100 See Movieland, http://www.movieland.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
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"Continue" link on the pop-up led consumers to a forty-second video
that recurred hourly.1° 1
The statements in the video constituted the alleged misstatements
in both the federal and state complaints.102 Consumers were told they
were legally obligated to purchase a subscription. A separate
statement on the company's website also asserted that failure to pay
"may result in an escalation of collection proceedings that could have
an adverse effect on your credit status." ° 3 The FTC characterized the
marketing tactic as an anonymous free trial with a negative option
feature.O4
Contrary to the defendants' statements, consumers had no legal
obligation after the free trial ended. The defendants had no ability to
carry out the stated threats about collection proceedings and credit
ratings because they had no personal information identifying the
consumers at that point. However, the defendants' downloaded
software had the ability to harass the computer user in a way that
traditional debt collectors could only dream about! Because the
software was so difficult to remove, many frustrated consumers
ultimately paid between $19.95 and $80 for the movie subscription
service just to stop the threatening pop-up videos. °5
In this case, the Washington attorney general relied on
prohibitions in Washington's Computer Spyware Act against installing
software on a computer without a user's consent, taking control of a
user's computer, and interfering with the user's ability to identify and
remove that software.10 6 As in all the foregoing examples, the FTC
10, See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Digital Enters. Complaint, supra note 98, at 25-30; State of
Washington v. Digital Enters. Complaint, supra note 99, at 6.3-6.7.
102 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Digital Enters. Complaint, supra note 98, at 48-50; State of
Washington v. Digital Enters. Complaint, supra note 99, at 9.2.2.
103 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Digital Enters. Complaint, supra note 98, at 30.
104 The paradox in this characterization is that negative option marketing is based on a
subscriber relationship between a book club or CD club, for example, that sends its
subscribers periodic notices of the item they will receive if they do not decline it.
Anonymity defies the underlying premise of negative option marketing: the customer can
be sent the product and billed for it because they agreed to such a transaction in the
original subscription. Mark Huffman, Negative Option: When No Means Yes,
CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, Nov. 7, 2005,
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/newso4/2005/negative-option.html.
105 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Digital Enters. Complaint, supra note 98, at 37.
106 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.270.020(4), 19.270.040(1) (2007).
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relied on its general authority against unfair and deceptive trade
practices.
Washington settled its case against the defendants for $50,000,107
and the FrC settled its case for just over $500,000.108 In both orders,
the defendants agreed to discontinue anonymous free trials but can
continue to offer and collect payment for the subscription service with
downloaded software.1° 9 Both orders require proper disclosure of all
software to be downloaded in conjunction with future contracts for
the service," ° as well as proper consent from the computer owner."'
Many of the particulars regarding disclosures and other future
software practices are identical in the federal and state orders.112 Both
orders require proper control of affiliates to ensure compliance with
the consent decrees.113
Of course, the major difference is that the FTC has the power to
enforce its order throughout the United States, while the Washington
Attorney General is confined to his state. Accordingly, the FTC
ordered the defendants to terminate any recurring billing of
consumers who had enrolled after a free trial but were not continuing
to use the service. 114 Presumably, this order was intended to protect
107 Stipulated Agreement and Order, State of Washington v. Digital Enters., No. 06-2-
26030-9SEA at 1.3 (King County Super. Ct. Apr. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Digital Enterprise
Stipulated Agreement], available at
http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/News/Press_Releases/2007/MovielandStip
ulatedAgreementOrdero419o7.pdf.
18 Settlement Agreement and Stipulated Final Order, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Digital
Enters., No. CV-o6-4923 at 13 (C.D. Ca. Sept. 11, 2007) [hereinafter Digital Enterprise
Settlement], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o623oo8/o7o9o5digitalenterprisesstipfnl.pdf.
lo9 See Digital Enterprise Stipulated Agreement, supra note 107, at 3.3; See also Digital
Enterprise Settlement, supra note io8, at 5.
110 See Digital Enterprise Stipulated Agreement, supra note 107, at 3.5; See also Digital
Enterprise Settlement, supra note io8, at 6-7.
- See Digital Enterprise Stipulated Agreement, supra note 107, at 3.6; See also Digital
Enterprise Settlement, supra note io8, at 8.
112 See, e.g., Digital Enterprise Stipulated Agreement, supra note 107, 3.7; See also Digital
Enterprise Settlement, supra note 1o8, at 9-11.
113 See Digital Enterprise Stipulated Agreement, supra note 107, at 3.8-3.10; See also
Digital Enterprise Settlement, supra note 1o8, at 11-12.
114 See Digital Enterprise Settlement, supra note 1o8, at 14.
CAIN
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
individuals who had ordered the service just to break the cycle of pop-
up ads rather than actually using the service. The FTC also ordered
the defendants to post instructions on its various websites for
removing any of its software from a user's computer. 115 The same
instructions must also be e-mailed to customers who paid for the
service.116 Such an order under the Washington law could only apply
to Washington residents.
The Washington settlement money will be distributed to
Washington citizens who are eligible for a refund. 117 The federal
settlement is for "consumer redress,""n8 and thus the defendants must
provide the FrC with the names and contact information of
consumers who are eligible for a refund.
As noted above, these settlement agreements do not reflect any
legal conclusions by a court about the alleged wrongdoing and the
exact violations of law they reflect. Washington's Attorney General is
proud that his state is "leading the battle against online fraud.""19
Nevertheless, the Movieland.com case does not suggest that special
spyware-specific legislation is necessary to address fraudulent
misstatements or nondisclosure simply because the fraud is
perpetrated using programming tactics. The FTC and Washington
asserted claims against the same defendants based on identical
behavior. Both regulators alleged that the software-generated
statements falsely represented consumers' actual obligations. The
FrC settled its case under long-held authority to regulate false and
misleading advertising, a power every state attorney general also
holds. Accordingly, the unique programming tactics and the fraud
perpetrated by these defendants using software did not require any
new or special authority to regulate.
15 Id. at 16.
116 Id.
117 Press Release, Attorney General McKenna Settles with Movieland.com and Associates
Concerning Pop-Up Payment Demands (Apr. 19, 2007), available at
http://www.atg.wa.gov/pressrelease.aspx?8dd=1448o.
118 See Digital Enterprise Settlement, supra note io8, at 13.
119 Press Release, McKenna Announces Fifth Computer Spyware Case; Washington Sues
Three Internet Affiliate Advertisers (Feb. 7, 2007), available at
http://www.atg.wa.gov/pressrelease.aspx?id=12328.
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VI. LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS
Clearly, the Washington Attorney General feels empowered by his
state's spyware statute. However, ten other states have spyware-
specific legislation and they are not showing the same activism as
Washington. Nothing in these case studies suggests that
Washington's spyware-specific legislation has made prosecution of the
cases easier or resulted in better consumer protection than traditional
anti-fraud prosecutions by the FTC or by New York.
A consent decree, however, is not the same as a trial verdict or an
appellate decision. What the current federal and state law could
impose on an unwilling defendant may be somewhat different. If the
types of cases discussed herein were pursued all the way through to a
decision by an appellate court, the regulators may encounter two
separate legal roadblocks under existing law. The first is the EULA.
The Odysseus Advertising, Direct Revenue, and ERG cases
discussed above all included complaints that notices to computer
users were not readily available or clear enough to adequately disclose
the existence of ad-generating software to be downloaded.120 In some
cases, the consumer had to link to a separate website to find any
information about the true nature of what was being downloaded. In
other cases, a notice was buried deep in lengthy legalese. The reader
was not required to navigate to the relevant information about the ad-
generating code in order to download the sought-after product.
Regulators alleged that these notices amounted to unfair and
deceptive trade practices.
Traditional contract law may deem a contract unconscionable and
unenforceable based on factors such as unfair surprise, lack of notice,
and disparity of bargaining power.12 1 Such concepts could apply to
notices buried in lengthy online agreements or linked through many
websites. Accordingly, existing common law and regulatory authority
could suffice to protect consumers against overly-dense or circuitous
EULAs that regulators characterize as unfair trade practices.
On the other hand, courts have held that "click through" web
agreements are binding on consumers.1 22 These results cast doubt on
120 See supra notes 63-84 and accompanying text.
121 Dawn Davidson, Click and Commit: What Terms are Consumers Bound to When They
Enter Web Sites, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1171, 1196 (2000).
122 Lydia J. Wilhelmi, Ensuring Enforceability: How Online Businesses Can Best Protect
Themselves from Consumer Litigation, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 181, 197 (2002).
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whether the FTC and state regulators could get judgments in cases
where the alleged deception was a lengthy EULA that did not
prominently disclose to consumers that ad-generating software was
being downloaded.
Further, current state spyware-specific statutes do not address the
issue of inadequate disclosure or appropriate notice.123 Accordingly,
this is one area in which new federal legislation would be appropriate.
Federal law could mandate national online disclosure protocols.
States could remain empowered to enforce that law along with
provisions of their own state spyware laws that do not conflict with
such a federal notice law.
The next stumbling block in existing law that could impede legal
control of spyware is control of the "affiliate" ad distribution network.
As discussed above, the Internet advertising model is facilitated by a
vast web of parties who distribute the ad-generating software by
programming it into many downloadable products. These affiliates
are usually paid "per impression," so they are motivated to load the
ad-generating code in a vast number of locations online.124 Most of
the consent decrees in the foregoing cases call for the defendants to
control these affiliates to insure compliance with the consent decrees.
Current common law of agency and contracts usually does not
impose liability on vendors when their independent contractors
deceptively distribute a product like those discussed above. Further,
as explained above, only a few existing state spyware laws impose
liability for "conscious avoidance" of knowledge about prohibited
downloads.125 This is the closest that current law comes to binding an
adware vendor for acts within their affiliate distribution channel.
Unfortunately, this "conscious avoidance" standard requires proof
that the vendor turned a blind eye to the unlawful acts of an affiliate,
which may be difficult to prove in many far-flung adware distribution
networks.
A better legislative approach would be to impose an affirmative
duty on adware vendors to control the distribution of their software.
This approach could actually reign in mass online distribution of
unwanted ad-generating software. Federal law should create this
123 Benjamin Edelman, California's Toothless Spyware Law, Sept. 29, 2004,
http://www.benedelman.org/news/o929o4-1.html.
124 See supra notes 17-29 and accompanying text.
125 See, e.g., Consumer Prot. Against Computer Spyware Act, S.B. 1436, 2003-2004 Sess.
§ 2(32)(22947.2)-(22947.3) (Ca. 2004), available at
http://pub.bna.com/eclr/sb1436.htm.
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duty, similar to what defendants have agreed to in the foregoing
consent decrees. State attorneys general should be empowered to
enforce this federal standard, along with the FTC.
A similar duty could be imposed on all advertisers for the harm
caused by the deceptive distribution of their ads on the Internet. In
2007, the state of New York entered into consent decrees with
Cingular Wireless (now AT&T), Travelocity, and Priceline for their ads
that were delivered through adware distributed by Direct Revenue.
The New York attorney general accused these advertisers of deception
because they had "turned a blind" eye to the deceptive practices of
their adware vendor.126 This was the first enforcement action against
buyers of Internet advertising. All defendants agreed to a series of
controls over future Internet advertising such as full disclosure of the
presence of ad-code, meaningful consent, practicable removal, and
prominent branding.127 The settlement imposes due diligence of the
advertising over future Internet advertising contracts to investigate
and control how their advertising is delivered.128 Defendants Cingular
and Priceline agreed to pay $35,000 and Travelocity agreed to pay
$30,000.129
Finally, the most dramatic step would be to impose strict liability
on all advertisers and adware vendors for deceptive distribution of ad-
generating software, regardless of due diligence. This would be
comparable to strict products liability imposed on all sellers in the
chain of distribution for defective products that cause personal injury.
This step should be the last legal resort if the deceptive spyware
distribution problem is not curtailed by other legal strategies
discussed above. Further, before such strict liability could be
imposed, a standard beyond "deceptive" or "unfair" would need to be
established for what programming behaviors triggered the liability.
Such a standard would have to include the disclosure mandates and
other notice mandates discussed above.
126 Office of the Att'y Gen., Groundbreaking Settlements Hold Advertisers Responsible for
Displaying Ads Through Deceptively Installed "Adware" Programs, Jan. 29, 2007,
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/mediacenter/2007/jan/jan29b-07.html.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id
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CONCLUSION
Numerous cases have been litigated between adware vendors and
makers of anti-spyware scanning programs for alleged defamation by
including "legitimate" adware in a spyware scan. 130 Securities
regulation cases hinge on whether adware vendors have misled
investors when they did not discuss in company disclosures the
possible implication of pending "spyware" legislation. 131 Federal
legislation needs to end this confusion and dictate once and for all
what products are categorized as offending "spyware." A bright line
needs to be drawn between legitimate ad-generating software that
keeps the price of sought-after online content down (or free) and
products that frustrate computer users and make them wish they had
never encountered the vendor's products.
That line should be based on new federal notice requirements
discussed above that any ad-generating program either meets or does
not. Research on the best notice protocols should drive that federal
legislation and rulemaking.132 This bright defining line in a new
federal law should also rely on trends in current state spyware-specific
laws against changing computer settings and uninstall capabilities.
Code that does not provide and respond to clear and easy removal
instructions would be labeled spyware. The FTC should be
empowered to continually update and revise these definitions as
technology evolves.
By contrast, "spyware" is not the appropriate characterization for
any and all examples of online false advertising regarding downloaded
software. The definition of spyware should not include cases of
purchased software that do not perform as promised, including
spyware removal programs, unless the programs include damaging
code that denies the computer user control over the machine.
Traditional false advertising and warranty law should be left to handle
cases of buyers' remorse for products that do not perform as
promised. Computer users must accept that online purchases of
downloaded content require the same scrutiny as any other products
that buyers might introduce into their homes or offices.
130 Benjamin Edelman, Threats against Spyware Detectors, Removers, and Critics,
http://www.benedelman.org/spyware/threats (last updated Sept. 20, 2007).
131 In re Miva, Inc., Sec. Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d. 1242 (M.D. Fla. 2007); In re Navarre Corp.
Sec. Litig., 2o06 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92604 (D. Minn. 2006).
132 See, e.g., Blanke, supra note 17; Good et al., supra note 17.
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Nothing in future federal spyware legislation should prevent state
enforcement. In Pike v. Bruce Church, the U.S. Supreme Court
established a two-part test to determine if a state law imposes an
undue burden on interstate commerce.13 3 First, the state must assert a
legitimate state interest for its regulation. The problems with spyware
discussed above easily satisfy this requirement.134 Then the state
statutory burden on interstate commerce is weighed against the local
benefit derived from the state law.135 The Washington and New York
prosecutions reveal enforcement that is nearly identical to the FTC's.
Accordingly, compliance with existing or new state spyware legislation
does not impose the kind of undue burden on interstate commerce
that would justify preemption of state spyware laws.
Nothing about the problems with spyware distribution are
insurmountable. Existing federal and state authority needs to be
bolstered with federal legislation to clarify the offending behaviors
and impose duties on those at the top of the ad distribution channel.
133 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
134 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
'35 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
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